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Erin Beeghly’s “Stereotyping as Discrimination” is—characteristically—clear, thorough, and 
persuasive, rich with incisive arguments and thought-provoking case studies. In defending 
the view that stereotyping often constitutes discrimination, she makes a powerful case that, 
“Living ethically means cultivating a certain kind of ‘inner’ life and avoiding pernicious 
habits of thought, no matter how culturally pervasive” (Beeghly 2021b, 13). Support for such 
claims is traced back not just to Aristotle and the Ten Commandments (Beeghly 2021b, 10), 
but also to critical social traditions. “As feminists and theorists of race have long noted, the 
most intimate aspects of our selves, including our ways of thinking, agency, and modes of 
embodiment, are among the mechanisms of group oppression” (Beeghly 2021b, 13). 
 
I offer, first, a tiny friendly amendment to one brief passage, followed by invitations to 
explore some of the further potential implications of Beeghly’s central theses. 
 
Which Counterfactuals When? 
 
Beeghly’s analysis of the Epistemic Shortcut Argument explores how “jumping to 
conclusions” can be discriminatory. She draws on Fanon’s report of asking a white person 
for directions and being answered in pidgin rather than French. Here and elsewhere, Beeghly 
carefully considers different senses of discrimination that might be at play, and one passage 
considers the “literal behavioral sense.” She writes: 
 
The idea here is not that stereotypic snap judgments constitute behavior per 
se. Rather, the view is that shortcuts must be contrasted with the relevant 
alternative, i.e., more laborious and careful ways of judging individuals. More 
laborious methods of judgment involve doing things in a literal behavioral 
sense: asking questions, listening carefully, looking up information online, 
and so forth. Keeping this contrast in mind, here is the proposal. The white 
train passenger would have taken a longer epistemic route, hence would have 
behaved differently, if a visibly white stranger had approached him. The 
counterfactual behavior is what grounds the claim that stereotyping 
constitutes discriminatory treatment (Beeghly 2021b, 5). 
 
I agree with Beeghly that appeals to counterfactuals are necessary in cases like these—
although, admittedly, I am less versed in the literature on discrimination and can imagine 
how these matters are the subject of controversy. I also agree that, in many cases, the 
relevant counterfactuals will involve either a) judging members of marginalized groups more 
quickly and carelessly than they would have judged members of privileged groups, or b) 
judging members of marginalized groups with more scrutiny and even suspicion than they 
would have judged members of privileged groups (Beeghly 2021b, 6).  
 
But I’m not sure about the relevant counterfactual in this specific case. Had the person 
asking for directions also been white, would the white passenger really have slowed down to 
consider things? I suspect the passenger would just automatically speak as they do to most 








cognitive shortcuts tailored for public interactions with members of their own race, 
nationality, etc.  
 
But there are still relevant counterfactuals here, such as those that vary the discriminator rather 
than the discriminatee. These include something like a “reasonable person” standard: How 
would a less racist person have responded, or, to put it in less loaded terms, how would 
someone who was not stereotyping have acted in these cases? Some of these counterfactuals, 
with more virtuous question-answerers, will also involve shortcuts, e.g., automatically 
responding in French to someone who asks you a question in French. But some of them will 
involve more cognitive labor: listening more carefully, pausing for a moment to take in more 
information about the situation, thinking about how to respond, and asking follow-up 
questions before answering. 
 
(What) Are Stereotyping and Discrimination? (What) Do We Want Them to Be? 
 
One of the especially helpful features of Beeghly’s paper (and her oeuvre more generally!) is 
the careful attention to the polysemy of terms like “stereotyping” and “discrimination.” Here 
she considers how stereotyping can count as discrimination across a variety of meanings of 
“discrimination.” These disambiguations are illuminating contributions in and of themselves, 
and, again, the arguments are compelling. 
 
That said, within this specific paper, Beeghly largely treats these topics in purely 
“descriptive” and “metaphysical” terms: given precise and neutral definitions of the terms, 
what are the sufficient conditions for Xs to count as Ys?  
 
There are other questions that we, as critical social philosophers, could ask here. Taking cues 
from Sally Haslanger’s (2012) distinctions between operative, manifest, and target concepts 
(respectively), we might ask: 
 
1. How do people actually use the terms/concepts “stereotyping” and 
“discrimination”? 
2. How do people think and report that they use these terms? 
3. How should people use these terms? 
 
Beeghly has explicitly appealed to contrasts between empirically descriptive, metaphysical, 
and normative/critical approaches in earlier work, such as in her paper arguing against the 
widespread view that stereotypes are always or typically false. There Beeghly writes: 
 
Though the essay is arguably an exercise in metaphysics because I evaluate 
the falsity hypothesis as a thesis about what stereotypes are, it is also an 
exercise in social philosophy. Part of my argument against the falsity 
hypothesis will be that it fails to serve the critical function needed for a good 
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In fact, the normative question (3) above can be broken down further, depending on which 
kinds of “should” we’re interested in. Here are two more specific questions:  
 
4. How should we use these terms to minimize misunderstanding and 
facilitate communication? 
5. How should we use these terms critically, to help us call out and fight 
injustice and oppression? 
 
Making headway on (4) requires paying attention to (1) and (2). And if we’re looking at 
purely descriptive linguistic/conceptual questions, about how people tend to use these 
terms, then we have to grapple immediately with the challenge of messy polysemy. These 
words mean different things in different contexts. The same speakers use these terms in 
distinctive ways across different situations. More to the point, some communities and 
subgroups use these terms in one set of ways while other communities use these terms in 
other ways. 
 
Concretely, there are two particular communities and contexts that seem to treat it as 
important to distinguish stereotyping from discrimination:  
 
a. intergroup social-scientific theorizing 
b. anti-discrimination legal practices 
 
(I have more confidence in what I’m about to say about the former than the latter.)  
 
Intergroup Social-Scientific Theorizing 
 
Any textbook you pick up in psychology, sociology, etc., that discusses “prejudice,” 
“stereotyping,” and “discrimination” (and any internet search you do of those three terms 
together) will deliver some version of a familiar and pretty sharp three-part distinction. Here 
is leading psychologist Susan Fiske’s (2021) recent gloss: 
 
People are often biased against others outside of their own social group, 
showing prejudice (emotional bias), stereotypes (cognitive bias), and 
discrimination (behavioral bias). 
 
… people put other people into groups, using that label to inform their 
evaluation of the person as a whole—a process that can result in serious 
consequences. This module focuses on biases against social groups, which 
social psychologists sort into emotional prejudices, mental stereotypes, and 
behavioral discrimination. These three aspects of bias are related, but they 
each can occur separately from the others (Dovidio and Gaertner, 2010; 
Fiske, 1998). For example, sometimes people have a negative, emotional 
reaction to a social group (prejudice) without knowing even the most 









Prejudice is an evaluation or emotion toward people merely based on their 
group membership. 
 
Stereotype is a belief that characterizes people based merely on their group 
membership. 
 
Discrimination is behavior that advantages or disadvantages people merely 
based on their group membership. 
 
Beeghly is, of course, well aware of these well-worn social-scientific definitions (e.g., Beeghly 
2015). But to get at long last to the punchline, even though Beeghly is right that stereotyping 
sometimes or always constitutes discrimination, there are further questions to ask about 
potential payoffs and perils of actually speaking that way. For example, given that social 
scientists explicitly cordon off discrimination (qua behavioral stuff) from stereotyping (qua 
cognitive stuff), taking Beeghly’s proposals on board might risk miscommunication and 
misunderstanding, setting back efforts for interdisciplinary crosstalk and collaboration. Some 
of my questions here are: 
 
• Should we push for using these terms interchangeably in many of the 
contexts where stereotyping constitutes discrimination? What would it 
actually look like if we started speaking as if stereotyping was often, just as 
such, discrimination? And that wrongful stereotyping was just as such 
wrongful discrimination?  
 
• Or should we, in general or in certain specific contexts, continue to reserve 
the term “stereotyping” for the more “purely cognitive” stuff (or the ostensibly 
or comparatively more cognitive stuff—like Beeghly’s example of stereotyping 
fellow bus-riders while mind-wandering and staring out the window)?  
 
• Finally, would Beeghly advocate that social scientists rewrite their 
textbooks? If so, how much revision is in order? Is it still OK for them to list 
the three terms, as long as they immediately follow them up with 
clarifications that reflect Beeghly’s compelling points?  
 
• Or should we trash the tripartite distinction altogether? What remaining 
purpose, if any, does it serve? 
 
These questions are entangled with broadly empirical and open-ended issues, probably not 
best settled from the armchair, but I’m curious what Beeghly thinks about them. 
 
Readers might infer from the tenor of this discussion that I am advocating for preserving the 
standard terminological classifications. Shame on you for taking epistemic shortcuts! I am 
already on the record as challenging the “prejudice” vs. “stereotype” distinction, especially 
with respect to implicit stereotypes and prejudices (Madva and Brownstein 2018). Although 
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the other is intuitively clear and familiar enough, the psychological questions about whether 
there are two genuine mental kinds here, and if so, how to distinguish them, remain up in 
the air. Michael Brownstein and I argued, for example, that all implicit stereotypes are 
evaluative and affect-laden.  
 
Subsequently, social psychologists have subjected the prevailing prejudice-stereotyping 
distinction to empirical scrutiny (Kurdi et al. 2019; Phills, Hahn, and Gawronski 2020). Their 
work casts doubt on popular theories that treat implicit prejudices and stereotypes as 
grounded in distinct neural substrates (e.g., Amodio and Ratner 2011). It calls into question 
intuitive but testable claims like Fiske’s that people can “have a negative, emotional reaction 
to a social group (prejudice) without knowing even the most superficial reasons to dislike 
them (stereotypes).” This research also challenges converse hypotheses, e.g., that people can 
harbor “mere beliefs” about social groups devoid of evaluative or emotional significance. On 
one interpretation of the relation between prejudices and stereotypes, for example, a 
person’s evaluative (prejudicial) responses to a person simply reflect the net valence of all 
their momentary (stereotypical) thoughts about them (Gawronski and Bodenhausen 2006). 
 
In a similar vein, Beeghly’s (2021b, 6–7) appeals to embodied cognition suggest that we 
should be skeptical that people can have much in the way of “mere social thoughts and 
feelings” that never express themselves in behavior in problematic ways. The truth will out, 
and so will people’s pernicious ways of thinking and feeling about social groups and their 
members. As she notes, the point is not just that our inner lives inevitably “leak out,” but 
that the outer is partially constitutive of the inner. Vast swaths of our social thoughts and 
feelings may have essentially motivational and action-oriented features, guiding our goals and 
motor orientation to the world. 
 
So, probably, I would urge Beeghly to go ahead and advocate for substantive revisions to 
social-scientific dogmas and textbooks. One less radical way to do this would be to treat 
thoughts, feelings, and behaviors as three different aspects or components of a single social-
cognitive construct, rather than as three self-standing constructs of their own (see also 
Brownstein and Madva 2012b; 2012a; Gendler 2008). There is, interestingly enough, already 
precedence for this sort of approach within social psychology. Although “prejudice” is often 
defined as a purely affective social response, it is also often defined as a kind of “attitude,” 
which (as social psychologists use the term) is comprised of three components. Can you 
guess what three they are? 
 
Prejudice is typically conceptualized as an attitude that, like other attitudes, 
has a cognitive component (e.g., beliefs about a target group), an affective 
component (e.g., dislike), and a conative component (e.g., a behavioral 
predisposition to behave negatively toward the target group) (Dovidio et al. 
2010, 5). 
 
Theorizing thoughts, feelings, and actions as a “package deal” in this way might represent a 








circularly defined is a good indicator, if anything is, that there’s ample room for clarifying 
and revising prevailing social-scientific discourse and theory. 
Yet I still have some reservations about leaping headlong into the full-blown conflation of 
“stereotyping” and “discrimination.” What would it mean, I wonder, for anti-discrimination 
legal practitioners to linguistically and conceptually reengineer their practices along Beeghly’s 
lines? 
 
Anti-Discrimination Legal Practices 
 
It goes without saying that some of the most important avenues for resisting injustice and 
oppression go through the courts and anti-discrimination law. I am less knowledgeable about 
the parlances of those practicing anti-discrimination law than of those practicing social 
science. Some of what I know is based on Beeghly’s other work, as when she notes the 
disagreements among Supreme Court Justices regarding the meaning and nature of 
stereotypes (Beeghly 2021a, 34–35). But it seems that some version of the tripartite 
distinction is operative in legal contexts as well. Legal action around discrimination targets 
how people are actually treated, whether by other individuals in formal, informal, or 
unstructured settings, or by those crafting or acting in accordance with facially or indirectly 
discriminatory laws, norms, and regulations—as opposed to targeting how people “merely” 
think and feel.  
 
Again, I think Beeghly is conceptually and metaphysically correct that stereotyping can be 
discriminatory. Acknowledging this, the key question is whether we might still want, for our 
multifarious legal purposes, to continue granting that there can be a lot of daylight between 
stereotyping (merely thinking bad thoughts) and discrimination (committing wrongful 
actions and writing unjust laws, sometimes on the basis of those bad thoughts). If we start 
thinking and talking seriously about wrongful forms of stereotyping not just as morally 
condemnable and in need of amelioration but as full-blown discrimination, does or should 
anything follow legally speaking? It’s one thing to acknowledge, as I agree with Beeghly that 
we should, the moral imperative of cultivating more virtuous inner lives. But do the practical 
upshots explored by Beeghly extend beyond the ethical realm and into the legal? If so, how? 
If not, why not? 
 
If it’s true that in legal settings, part of what it means to call something discriminatory is to say 
that it is or should be legally actionable, does it follow that categorizing stereotyping as 
discrimination can make stereotyping somehow legally actionable, too? The elephant in the 
room can be named in two words: thought police. Pursuing this approach would likely raise 
all sorts of hackles about the Big Data Big State monitoring and regulating not just our 
speech and action but our very thoughts. There will, of course, be tons to say here, from 
observations of the presumably myriad objectionable and unobjectionable ways in which the 
government and other powerful corporate actors already try to shape our thoughts (with 
varying degrees of success) to questions about how one could even measure or prove what 
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One way to preserve something like the three-part distinction for legally actionable purposes 
might be to treat each category as best-suited for picking out a specific subset of “behavioral” 
biases. Economist Marie-Anne Valfort (2018), for example, suggests that we can think of 
prejudice as “taste-based discrimination” (e.g., when you don’t hire someone because you 
just don’t like members of that group) and stereotyping as “statistical discrimination” (e.g., 
when you don’t hire someone because you believe, whether on accurate or inaccurate 
grounds, that members of their group will take more sick days than members of other 
groups). I don’t think Beeghly would buy into Valfort’s particular way of sorting things, but 
there might be some traction to the idea that stereotyping represents one important subset 
of discrimination, subject to a somewhat distinctive set of norms and modes of practical, 
moral, and legal redress, in contrast to other subsets of discrimination. 
 
Symmetry and Asymmetry Between Belief and Action 
 
I’m very sympathetic with Beeghly’s proposal that many of the wrong-making features of 
behavioral discrimination will also apply to “mere” in-the-head stereotyping. That said, the 
strongest argument for normative asymmetry (or, more modestly, the strongest argument 
against terminological conflation) here might be something like the following: normatively 
speaking, whether we are crafting laws and policies or deciding how to act in particular cases, 
we want our planning to be based on as accurate a view of the world as possible. As Beeghly 
has long argued (e.g., 2015; 2021a), stereotypes have various important roles to play in giving 
us an accurate picture of the world. It’s important for us to be aware, first, of the prevailing 
pernicious stereotypes that shape people’s interpretations of and reactions toward others and 
themselves. But, second, if we’re defining stereotypes very generally to include “beliefs about 
typical group traits” (Beeghly 2021b, 2), then that means that even generalizations like “Black 
drivers are more likely to be pulled over by the police” and “Black children are more likely to 
be raised in single-parent homes,” are stereotypes, even though my belief in them is both 
true and justified. These are important facts that we should attend to in many deliberative 
contexts (Madva 2016). These generalizations often reflect, in sometimes straightforward but 
often complex ways, injustices we are called to resist. 
 
To the extent that such stereotypes have important roles to play in giving us an accurate 
picture of the world, we shouldn’t try to “ban them from thought” so much as we should try 
to take care in “putting them into action.” Calling these thoughts discriminatory—even if we 
are at pains to clarify when we mean “discriminatory” in a neutral versus evaluative sense—
might impede our ability to confront the social facts as they really are in order to decide how 
we want them to be.  
 
Alternatively, the foregoing might not be so much a case for normative asymmetry as one 
gesture toward fleshing out Beeghly’s insistence on pluralistic and context-dependent 
approaches to these matters. She rightly notes that one can defend normative symmetry 
“while remaining attentive to the special normative features of thought, speech, actions, and 









Or maybe much of the huffing and puffing of this commentary boils down to vague 
concerns about the limits of our collective linguistic agency. No matter how much academics 
and activists try to get folks to think of “racism” as primarily a structural rather than an 
individualistic wrong, public conversation can’t seem to escape the gravitational pull of the 
individualistic interpretation. Similarly, to the extent that the folk, and the social scientists, 
and the lawyers, harbor such ingrained, preconceived notions of both the meaning and the 
intrinsically negative valence of “stereotyping” and “discrimination,” is trying to push back on the 
prevailing ways of speaking about these ideas like trying to plow the sea? I hope not, but in 
the short term, our time might be better spent working for social change while 
accommodating ourselves to these popular ways of speaking, even as Beeghly compels us to 
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